The question of incentives (Triebfeder) plays a very important role in Kant’s practical philosophy. In the *Critique of Practical Reason*, Kant dedicates a whole chapter exclusively to this topic and claims that “the incentive of the human will (and of the will of every created rational being) can never be anything other than the moral law” (5: 72). As such, the moral law is not only the objective determining ground of the will, but functions also as a subjective determining ground of an action, i.e. as an incentive. Despite of the similar philological background of these two terms, the concept of Triebfeder appears to be clearly opposed to Kant’s concept of Trieb. On the one hand, the concept of Triebfeder functions in Kant’s practical philosophy as an intelligible ground of the will. On the other hand, the concept of Trieb represents the material ground of organic nature and is conceived as the fundamental power (Grundkraft) of organic substances. In my presentation, I will offer a detailed comparison of these two concepts and show that despite of the obvious differences they nonetheless have a common conceptual origin.