Karl Leonhard Reinhold’s and Friedrich Schiller’s conception of drive can be interpreted as a systematic response to a theoretical ambivalence that can be found in Kant’s conception of “drive” and “driving force”. For on the one hand, a “drive” is, according to Kant, something that belongs to our nature and is therefore heteronomous. A “driving force”, on the contrary, is something autonomous, since it is pure reason that becomes practical in the form of the moral feeling of respect. Reinhold distinguishes between a selfish (“eigennütziger”) and an unselfish (“uneigennütziger”) drive. Both drives are, according to Reinhold “driving forces of the will”, insofar as they are “engaged in the arbitrary (“willkürlich”) satisfaction or frustration of our desire”. In doing so, Reinhold revaluates the drive as something that is compatible with our freedom of the will: they incline our will but do not necessitate it. They are, so to speak, the vital basis of our free decision. Schiller distinguishes between three kinds of drive. The object of the form drive (“Formtrieb”) is the Gestalt of the world, its intelligible structure and necessity, whereas the object of the material drive (“Stofftrieb”) is the human life and its sensual reality. In opposition to Reinhold, Schiller introduces a third drive that he calls the “play drive” (“Spieltrieb”). However, it is not an instance additional to the material and form drive, but rather designates the unity of both drives, in which “sensibility and reason are active at the same time”. Schiller calls this state a “higher necessity” that is similar to Harry Frankfurt’s conception of a “volitional necessity” and which describes our individual freedom.